moral philosopher come alive and blocks the current view of him as an economist. By proceeding in this manner, the author also succeeds in transplanting the reader for a few hours from the universe of today's rather flat social science to the still-enchanted universe of the Scottish Enlightenment.


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The classic literature on clientelism from Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, James C. Scott, Robert Putnam, S. N. Eisenstadt, and Luis Roniger stressed values, political culture, and subtle personal interrelations. *Patrons, Clients, and Policies*, edited by Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, instead builds a political economy/rational choice interpretation that generates a strikingly different framework and perspective on clientelism. Although the editors and contributors are political scientists, the core terms are economic. Thus clientelism is defined as contingent direct exchange, economic development factors are coded as supply- and demand-sided, and clientelism is strongly interpreted as deriving from low income (in contrast to Catholicism or Southern Italian personalism, or low trust, and similar cultural factors that earlier studies stressed).

The perspective is consistently developed. As income rises, “We interpret this to imply that demand side preference changes, induced by higher levels of development (resulting in human capital endowments, private sector labor market options, etc.) and a decreasing valuation of clientelistic payoffs among the more affluent” (p. 29). Thus poorer political systems are likely to provide more clientelistic goods and fewer programmatic goods. As countries like Japan or Italy grow more affluent, “increasing competitiveness makes clientelism prohibitively expensive” and leads to a “partial or complete erosion of clientelist linkage mechanisms” (p. 35). Even ethnic voting is “framed as a coordination game rather than a prisoner’s dilemma” (p. 39). War and monopolistic economies and parties reinforce clientelist patterns, even in developed countries like Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Japan. Competition undermines clientelism.

The authors discount the importance of legal or institutional arrangements, such as electoral systems, small member districts, proportional representation, and so forth. “Our volume shows instead that the interaction of (1) economic development; (2) political economy; (3) levels of party competition; and (4) patterns of ethnic heterogeneity explain more
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about mechanisms of democratic accountability than a country’s formal institutions” (p. 44).

The editors contribute substantial introductory and concluding chapters that elaborate these basic points. The style is essentially clear, straightforward prose—no equations or abstract propositions. There is minimal attention to ethnographic or quantitative data in the general sections, although the core chapters are often empirical. There is a confidence in presentation that makes the book analytically coherent and consistent. This coherence extends to the organization of the volume. Four main parts can be identified. The first includes general theoretical accounts (chaps. 2, 3, and 4), while the three others focus on different regions of the world according to their level of economic development: sub-Saharan Africa (chap. 1) and India (chaps. 5 and 6) represent regions under conditions of weak economic development, chapters 7–10 analyze countries with intermediate levels of economic development, like Brazil, Mexico, and Eastern European nations, and the last three chapters discuss postindustrial capitalist democracies.

The theoretically oriented chapters are uneven. Chapter 2, by Nicolas van de Walle, offers more of a regional comparative study than a properly speaking theoretical account of clientelism in sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter 3, by Luis Fernando Medina and Susan C. Stokes, offers a conventional rational choice theoretical model of political clientelism. Although elegant and parsimonious, their depiction of politics as a rational game over scarce resources in which information plays a crucial role is not convincing: their description of concrete political choices, such as Álvaro Uribe’s election as president of Colombia in 2002 (pp. 75–76), comes close to a caricature of the rationalistic kind. In chapter 4, Kanchan Chandra proposes a model of “self-reinforcing equilibrium of ethnic favoritism” (p. 85) according to which voters, under severe information constraints, are biased toward schemes of ethnic categorization and favoritism. In turn, confronted with voter biases, elites have a strong incentive to favor voters from their own ethnic group in their search for office.

The chapters on postcolonial, democratic India consistently apply this general theoretical orientation. In chapter 5, Wilkinson distinguishes three eras of clientelist politics in India, which mirror the subcontinent’s different stages of economic growth. The outcome of this analysis is predictable: as economic conditions improve, the costs of clientelism become less and less sustainable (p. 133). A similar trend is suggested in the following chapter by Anirudh Krishna. Like Wilkinson, he detects a considerable waning of older patronage-based associations and the concomitant rise of new forms of political participation in the last two decades in India. He describes how “non-caste-based political entrepreneurs—popularly known as naya netas (literally, new leaders)—have emerged” (p. 142). His portrait of these naya netas as ethnically and religiously neutral political actors, however, is not convincing. Apart from some anecdotal evidence (p. 156), Krishna does not provide any empirical evi-
Evidence to support his thesis that religion and ethnic background are completely absent from the ascent of the naya netas.

Of the chapters on countries with intermediate levels of development, the one by Beatriz Magaloni et al. on Mexico (chap. 8) is certainly the most sophisticated. The authors develop what they call a “portfolio theory of electoral investment” (p. 182), according to which the extent of poverty, political competition, and the level of electoral risk explain the choice of clientelism vis-à-vis the provision of public goods. They apply this model to the case of Pronasol, a governmental program to fight poverty launched by Carlos Salinas in 1989, which over the years became known as a paradigmatic example of Mexican clientelism. Their findings, consistent with the book’s general argument, suggest that (1) clientelism is most prevalent at intermediate ranges of development and (2) controlling for levels of development, more political competition leads to a decrease in clientelism (p. 201).

Finally, Wolfgang C. Müller’s cross-sectional comparative analysis of 19 postindustrial democracies (chapter 11) merits special attention, as it is the only chapter in which institutional factors are taken into account. The chapter follows the typical rational choice institutionalist analytical framework: individual political behavior is guided by preferences, but constrained by the institutional framework (p. 256). Müller focuses on four layers of political institutions: electoral, legislative, executive, and what he calls “external institutional constraints” (p. 259). His findings corroborate the editors’ initial promise: “No specific institution is necessary for patronage becoming the dominant linkage strategy. Even less so is a specific institutional configuration sufficient to explain patronage” (p. 275). This nicely illustrates one of the book’s strengths—the remarkable consistency between theoretical claims and empirical findings. Yet a lack of serious attention to competing interpretations or effort to provide strong supporting evidence will probably lead the book to be most read and used by persons who already share the overall perspective. There is little effort to convince the reader that competing interpretations are incorrect.


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Elaine Weiner’s compact and very readable book *Market Dreams* begins with two intriguing questions. First, Weiner interrogates the common assertion that women have been the greatest losers with the end of state socialism in Central and Eastern Europe, asking if they have, indeed, borne the greatest costs of the “transition.” Second, if the end of state