

## REVISITING TOCQUEVILLE: CITIZENSHIP NORMS, POLITICAL REPERTOIRES, AND CULTURAL PARTICIPATION

Terry Nichols Clark  
*University of Chicago*

Filipe Carreira da Silva  
*Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon*

### 1. TOCQUEVILLE IN AMERICA AND THE NEO-TOCQUEVILLIANS' REVIVALISM

“**W**hat are the reasons for Tocqueville’s eternal youth?” This is the question Raymond Boudon asks in his recent book, *Tocqueville for Today* (Boudon 2006: 2). In other words, why do we keep reading *Democracy in America*, a book written in the 1830s, in order to understand how liberal democracy works today, both in the US and elsewhere? Boudon’s answer — that Tocqueville gave us a new and innovative sociological analysis that has yet to be surpassed — points to the exceptional character of his contribution to the understanding of modern societies. Alongside the names of Weber and Durkheim, Boudon doubtless includes Tocqueville as one of his most admired classic social thinkers. Curiously enough, Boudon’s assessment of Tocqueville as a sociological classic was itself an exceptional judgment only a generation ago.

It was through Raymond Aron’s seminal re-examination of Tocqueville’s work in the 1950s and 1960s that the author of *Democracy in America* and *The Ancient Regime and the Revolution* was redefined as one of sociology’s “founding fathers”. Taken in the context of the Cold

War, it is fairly easy to see why: Tocqueville gave us an alternative to Marxist sociology. In his political writings, Tocqueville had argued that all increasingly egalitarian modern societies were confronted with the choice of becoming either “free” or “despotic”, by which he meant either horizontally organized by means of a plurality of voluntary organizations or vertically structured in a hierarchical fashion.

This basic choice seemed to reflect the nature of the challenge faced by post-war societies much better than the idea of “class struggle” as proposed by Marx, and the interpretation helped put Tocqueville’s name in the sociological canon. But with notable exceptions like those of Boudon in France and Robert Bellah in the US (Bellah *et al.* 1985) and apart from the specific fields of historical and value sociology, sociology did not make much use of the Montesquieu–Tocqueville tradition until well into the 1980s. Dominated by functionalist and structuralist analysis, sociology had some difficulties incorporating a tradition that emphasizes the ability of the *homo sociologicus* to act more individualistically.

The spectacular revival of Tocqueville in the 1990s took place first not in sociology but in political science. Furthermore, when it eventually reached the sociological field later in that decade, those who took the lead were those who had always shown limited enthusiasm with the Marxist sociological orientation (e.g. Alexander 1998, 2006). But it was Robert S. Putnam, the political scientist from Harvard, who contributed most substantially to make Tocqueville the “theorist of the decade”, first with the 1993 *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* and two years later with the best-seller *Bowling Alone*.

Interest in Tocqueville was raised further by other factors: the post 1989 serious questioning of what is democracy, esp. in East Europe, China, and Latin America — and seeing Marxist answers as inadequate. The end of military dictatorships in Latin Am; global spread of democratic norms via mass media and internet. The continual rise of individualism; the pressing for ever more egalitarian redefinitions of democracy in Third World countries, such as the taking of power by the Untouchable Caste in India. The great policy stress on NGOs as critical to building democracy East Europe, Asia, and globally, led by best-selling books by George Soros and Francis Fukuyama. Suddenly, “neo-Tocquevillian” became a popular label amongst political scientists and political sociologists. It conveyed a theoretical re-appreciation of the role

of civil society in the making and maintenance of democratic regimes. In particular, Putnam made use of the notion of “social capital” (originally theorized by James Coleman: see Coleman 1988) to call attention to the indirect psychological effects of associational membership. As Putnam’s thesis goes, those who in the 1950s joined professional bowling leagues were unconsciously reinforcing their civic virtues: participation in this sort of voluntary associations led to a decrease in individualism, which had the unintended yet democratically worthy consequence of reinforcing political participation.

Since the 1960s, however, Putnam notices that more and more Americans began to “bowl alone”. He uses this metaphor to illustrate the empirical claim that the once thriving American civic life is facing a dangerous decline: as associational membership diminishes, the democratic virtues it used to nourish also decline. Putnam equates the revival of interest in Tocqueville to a pledge for the revival of a lost golden age of associational life, the so-called Tocqueville–Putnam model of political participation.

In our view, there are good reasons to reject this lament on theoretical grounds. First, this sort of revivalist tone is strange to Tocqueville’s work. Instead of orienting their analysis by reference to an idealized past, neo-Tocquevillians would do better if instead they would try to identify the causal mechanisms that allow one *to transcend the mere narrative of historical singularities to the scientific explanation of social and political events*. After all, it was Tocqueville who remarked, with a fair share of provocation, in favor of “talk[ing] about history but do not recount it” (2004 [1850–1858]: 467).

Second, revivalism is in itself a questionable strategy, as both the functions and trajectory of civic organizations and groups always depend upon the cultural and ideological context. The problem with revivalism is that it arbitrarily compares the present with a certain period in the past. If one takes a different perspective — a long term analysis, a systematic cross-national comparison, or some other historical period as a term of reference — revivalism soon reveals its limitations. It is thus crucial to understand the present context if one wishes to contribute to the understanding of the current political situation, including both an analysis of the values and of the practices of citizens around the globe.

In order to do so, we choose to study the last few decades in a cross-national perspective.<sup>1</sup> Contrary to Putnam, we do not assess the present

## PART FOUR ACTIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL REPERTOIRES




Figure 1: Factors driving toward the new political culture

in terms of some lost glorified past, but in its own terms. Through the Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation (FAUI) project, we have been monitoring the development of the New Political Culture in cities in the US and abroad since the mid-1970s (e.g. Clark 1981). This international project, the largest in the world on local level politics and value change, has allowed us to see how and where older class political models have been replaced by NPC ones: over 50 books have been published in the course of over three decades of international cooperation by teams from over 30 countries. What we have been finding out is a global tendency for the emergence of a new normative cluster of values and practices (see figure 1).

This new style of politics — we call it New Political Culture (NPC) — is the corollary of the cumulative combination of many previous

social changes, some of them mutually contradictory in terms of the traditional class political model: e.g. the last decades have seen moves 1) toward social liberalism (captured in the Postmaterialist index and other items), and 2) toward fiscal conservatism. This is a critical issue that the New Political Culture analysis has been illuminating since the 1970s. What drives the shift toward the NPC? Terry Clark and Ronald Inglehart identify 22 specific propositions, which fall under three general ideas: hierarchy, empowerment and structural conditions (Clark and Hoffmann-Martino 1998: 36ff.). Clark and Inglehart suggest seven general elements that help distinguish this NPC from traditional class politics: 1) the classic left–right dimension has been transformed; 2) social and fiscal/economic issues are explicitly distinguished; 3) social issues have risen in salience relative to fiscal/economic issues; 4) market individualism and social individualism grow; 5) questioning the welfare state (national governments seem to be losing much of their legitimacy as federalism and regionalism claim new converts); 6) the rise of issue politics and broader citizen participation, alongside the decline of hierarchical political organizations; 7) these NPC views are more pervasive among younger, more educated and affluent individuals, and societies (Clark and Hoffmann-Martino 1998: 10–13).

In addition, there has been a significant rise in salience of culture and the arts in the past few decades, the political significance of which is yet to be properly explored. We address this by first reviewing the theory of the New Political Culture and then adapting it to consumption, arts and culture via the new concept of “scene”.

As we will show, if one takes a global view on these general changes in political culture and combines them with detailed local analyses of urban processes of change, a compelling case emerges for one to discard the orthodox Tocqueville–Putnam model of political participation through formal associations. Our proposed alternative points to new forms of participation, leadership and legitimacy that are not only more globally widespread than the New England Tocqueville–Putnam political model, but are also much more in tune with the emergent patterns of political culture in the past few decades. From this perspective, Putnam’s lament loses much of its appeal. Our contention is that Putnam’s claim of a generalized civic decline since the 1960s in the US is not only theoretically unconvincing, given its questionable revivalist tone, but it is also empirically flawed. This is even more so outside the US, even in the

international book he edited, if one reads the chapters closely (Putnam 2002). Other forms of political participation have emerged and developed in this period, signalling the limitations of the Tocqueville–Putnam model of participation.

## **2. NPC MEANS BROADER POLITICAL REPERTOIRES**

The revivalism of neo-Tocquevillians like Putnam is based upon the claim that political participation has declined since the 1960s as an unintended consequence of a number of socio-economic developments. In what follows, we show that this claim does not stand up to empirical scrutiny. On the contrary, we suggest the opposite may actually be true. There has not been a decline but an increase in political participation in the last half a century. Such an increase is associated with the expansion of the repertoire of political action, a development that is very much “off the radar screen” of Putnam’s model. What has been happening since the 1960s in the US is nothing less but a shift in the very norms of citizenship: what constitutes political participation, what is generally considered to be the duties of a “good citizen”, has dramatically changed since the Eisenhower years.

In brief, one can describe the prevalent conception of citizenship in the mid-twentieth century as duty-based. Citizens’ duties included electoral participation, payment of taxes, and availability to serve in the military. In turn, citizens expected to have their civil, political, and certain economic and social rights protected. Almond and Verba’s 1963 classic *The Civic Culture* is perhaps the best description of the political culture in which this conception of citizenship originated and developed. They suggest a “threefold classification of participant, subject, and parochial” political cultures, where the highest degree possible of civicness corresponds to someone who devotedly performs his citizenship duties. Such a classification is itself exemplary of the mode of thinking associated with this duty-based idea of citizenship (Almond and Verba 1965 [1963]: 19). Likewise, Putnam describes the generation that experienced World War II and its aftermath as a “long civic generation”, due to its exceptional willingness to work for a political party and vote, to write letters to public officials, or attend political rallies (Putnam 2003: 45). The inculcation of citizenship duties functional to the political system was an elemental

aspect of the political socialization experience in this period. In short, this was a generation for whom the exercise of citizenship was closely related to norms of social order. The style of politics in mid-twentieth century Europe and North America still had strong elements of “class politics” and clientelism: left and right were clearly opposed to one another as hierarchical relations between the citizenry and their representatives predominated. The public questioning of racism, sexism, and homophobia, as well as the assertion of individual rights of self-expression, had to wait for the next generation to take place.

Indeed, all this began to change in the 1960s. The shift in citizenship norms from a class politics paradigm to the NPC is revealed as soon as one considers that the older debates about capitalism vs. socialism, and left vs. right, have gradually been complemented, if not replaced entirely, by new, issue-specific concerns, like feminism and environmental protection, among others. In contrast to the hierarchy and tradition of the past, individualism and egalitarianism exists more pervasively today. A new focus on the citizen, on neighborhoods, on individual participation and self-generated bottom-up rather than top-down politics has also become apparent. A new generation of political leaders, leaders who break old rules and break free from ideological categories, has gradually developed a new style of politics.


Consider the French case. If the General Charles de Gaulle was illustrative of the older class-politics style, Nicholas Sarkozy and his celebrity wife Carla Bruni are the consummate personification of NPC values. The shift from class politics and clientelism to NPC is also illustrated by individualizing lifestyles, exemplified in dress, entertainment, spontaneity, and volatility of choice. This same individualism — which can be expressed politically — is also expressed daily in people’s lives, in how they choose clothes, or where to spend their free time.

This tendency extends the individualism to many new domains: in contrast to tourists travelling in a large group to a classic, fixed destination, or travelling to the same vacation home with your family. Instead young persons increasingly find, or search for, more personalized lifestyles. Music provides yet another excellent illustration of this societal shift in norms and values. One could perhaps regret the fact that classical music is no longer taught to every middle-class child, as seemed more common in the upper middle class world of the 1950s. We suggest alternatively that one should try to understand the political implications of

**PART FOUR ACTIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL REPERTOIRES**

classical music’s new, broader scope. To wit: classical music finds itself in more venues than ever before, in concert halls, at festivals, on iPods, examined and re-examined daily through myriad niche interests by millions of people, and we would be remiss to overlook the significance of this broader influence of classical music in revivalist grieving over a lost golden age (Kimmelman 2008: 40).

Underlying this normative shift is the assumption that there are multiple components to citizenship. Traditional components include norms of law-abidingness, solidarity, criticism, and deliberation. NPC citizenship norms adds others that are more self-expressive and individualistic: political consumerism is one good illustration of this. If class politics was associated with a duty-based notion of citizenship, NPC comes associated with a more egalitarian, individualistic and expressive conception of what it means to be a citizen. These two basic components of citizenship currently coexist, especially in North America and West Europe (see table 1). Among different groups, however, their importance varies. Younger people tend to exhibit a stronger positive correlation to NPC citizenship norms (such as forming one’s own opinion) whereas older people are more often supportive of ideas like obeying the law (a classic civic duty).



**Table 1:** *Citizenship norms*

Source: WVS 2005 (countries in analysis: all OECD countries)

	Electoral activity		Direct action		Protest			Internet activism
	Vote	Attend pol. meetings or rally	Contact politician	Donate money	Sign petition	Take part in demonstration	Boycott	Join an internet pol. forum
Citizen duty	-0.048	0.039	-0.015	-0.055	-0.041	-0.171	-0.167	0.082
Engaged citizenship	-0.011	0.265	0.231	0.23	0.16	0.239	0.285	0.195
Age	-0.225	-0.009	-0.028	0.016	0.096	0.146	0.11	0.197
Education	-0.039	-0.015	-0.001	-0.023	0.018	-0.069	0.028	-0.067
Gender	0.012	0.091	0.061	-0.03	-0.044	0.045	-0.027	0.103
Left-right party affiliation	0.235	0.083	-0.01	0.006	0.08	0.203	0.063	0.035

Note: The values represent standardized regression coefficients (beta). All shaded cells represent statistically significant effects ( $p < 0.05$ ).

**Table 2: Norms of citizenship and political repertoires**

Source: ISSP 2004 (countries in analysis: UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, USA)

#### PART FOUR ACTIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL REPERTOIRES

The younger and more educated you are, the more likely you are to be dissatisfied with hierarchical, institutionalized forms of participation.

The relationship between values and practices is a particularly complex one. More work is needed to flesh out the exact causal mechanisms operating in this interface. Still, citizenship norms seem to correspond to certain political practices. For instance, it is more likely for someone holding socially liberal views on abortion and gay rights to boycott products for ethical reasons than those who do not. Conversely, someone for whom participation is a civic duty is more likely to vote. Note that both citizenship norms might promote political participation, only of a different kind. People closer to a NPC framework are more likely to participate in more expressive, individualistic, and non-institutionalized ways, given their dissatisfaction with the formal options of political participation. In turn, those who exhibit a more conventional conception of citizenship will certainly be more inclined to participate through institutionalized channels. Contrary to the conventional view that favors more institutionalized forms of participation (as if these were, from the standpoint of democracy, superior to informal ones), our contention is that they are complementary. To vote is certainly the most efficient way for a group of citizens to choose their representatives in a democratic fashion. Expressing one's views in an internet forum, however, can be equally important for the maintenance of democracy as a way of life. Moreover, as we will later show, the variety of political repertoires is larger than most political analysts are usually willing to accept. Once we confront the Calvinist civic tradition (strong in New England, the Netherlands, Scotland, and Switzerland for centuries, but now spreading globally) with other political cultures, we soon realize that glamour, irony, and entertainment can be alternative and powerful sources of political legitimacy.

In sum, at the same time as election turnout has been declining, people are engaging in other ways including working with informal groups in their communities, joining contentious activities, becoming internet activists and political consumers. In short, there was no decline in political participation in the past four decades in the US, but rather we experienced an extraordinary expansion of the repertoire of political action. People nowadays still vote and join political parties, but they do so in different ways (less deferential, more egalitarian: the democrat campaign for the 2008 Presidential election of Barack Obama, with its


massive voluntary door-to-door mobilization, provides a good illustration of this tendency); more importantly, they also join internet groups and boycott products for ethical and political reasons, both expressions of their more self-conscious individuality. But, one might ask, are people today participating *more* or *less* than fifty years ago, considering all forms of political activity? This is the question we try to answer next, again drawing on the findings of the FAUI project.

### 3. SHIFTING NORMS, INCREASING ENGAGEMENT

Based upon our previous work, we expect a decline (or, at best, a maintenance) of more institutionalized forms of political participation to be accompanied by an increase of the more individualized forms of participation associated with the NPC. This would be consonant with our main thesis that a new constellation of values and norms has been steadily establishing itself since the 1970s. As generations succeed one another, the prevalence of a class politics citizenship gives way to a more pluralist polity (Keane 1988) in which NPC citizenship (norms and practices) grows in salience. In table 4, we compare voting turnout and participation in electoral campaigns as institutionalized forms of political participation with more expressive forms such as participating in protest activities or in issue-oriented civic groups. By comparing the evolution of the two styles of politics in the US from the 1950s until the present we wish to put the Tocqueville–Putnam model and its associated jeremiad for the loss of a golden civic age to the test.

As we see below, the case for a general decline in civic participation lacks empirical support. The trends in political participation show a decline in electoral participation and political campaigns and a rise in all other forms of participation. The political engagement of the American public seems not to have declined in absolute terms but rather, given the enlargement of political repertoires, become more diverse. The normative pattern of what constitutes participation and citizenship has dramatically shifted since the 1960s. Internet activism, for instance, is less than ten years old and growing exponentially. The alleged decline has been in the traditional “class politics” paradigm of the 1950s, the model that Putnam takes for a civic golden era. People may not be participating as before in the professional bowling leagues he elects as “civically

**PART FOUR ACTIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL REPERTOIRES**



**Table 3: Types of Political Participation — US**

Voting: VEP Highest Office Turnout from [http://elections.gmu.edu/voter\\_turnout.htm](http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm); Signing a Petition, Joining in Boycotts and Attending lawful demonstrations from WVS.

beneficial”, but not for the reasons he suggests (civic anomie). The very foundations of democracy and citizenship have been changing in the US and abroad in the last few decades towards a more socially liberal, fiscally conservative political culture. With it, new trends of political participation have emerged, along with a more differentiated pattern of political participation. Individualistic and expressive forms of political participation are growing significantly, whereas traditional forms like voting are either stable or in decline.

There are, of course, forms of participation that, despite not being explicitly political in their nature and aims, perform nonetheless political functions. Tocqueville was among the first to call attention to the fact that membership in non-political voluntary organizations, from church groups to music associations, could have the unintended positive effect of stimulating democratic virtues. This classic insight has inspired a great deal of research on participation and civil society, including the recent revivalist neo-Tocquevillian strand led by Putnam. In what follows, we explore a largely ignored form of non-political participation that is not only changing the way we do politics today but it is also transforming how we conceive of citizenship — we refer to cultural participation.

#### 4. CULTURAL PARTICIPATION AS A “PUBLIC GOOD”

The rise of cultural issues is a critical, specific aspect of the NPC. As NPC develops, classic concerns of work and job decline, ceding their importance to a new creativity, a playfulness, an entrepreneurship that has come to define the ideal workplace. “Ideal” organizations like Microsoft or Google are detailed as having “campus-like creative settings”. They are the new models in business magazines like *Fortune* and *Business Week*. Work and leisure are no longer so isolated; leisure concerns penetrate the workplace. This recent yet widespread tendency of dedifferentiation directly questions the classic modernization theory’s thesis that functional differentiation is the dominant principle of societal organization. Driven by more income, education, and the NPC, culture and tourism are key parts of this transformation. Art is on the walls of many banks; major corporations sponsor theatre, music, and public art. Political leaders sense the importance of rising arts and culture concerns among citizens and look for ways to capture these concerns: via public art, music festivals, historic preservation of neighborhoods, museums, and more. Essen Germany, Naples Italy, Bogotá Colombia, and Chicago USA are all heavy industrial cities that have dramatically transformed themselves via creative mayors and arts and culture-based policies in the last decade or two. We cite these precisely as they were rapid but deep transformations by strong political leaders, not just continuation of a long tradition, as one finds in a Paris or Beijing. We see more bookstores, internet sites, coffee shops, and all forms of cultural activities in these cities and all over the world. Participants in our FAUI project have documented deep change in these and many other locations.

More generally, this rise of consumption, lifestyle, amenities, and culture is captured in emerging new theories of “post industrial society” that contrast with more traditional workplace theories of which Marxism is the most extreme. Classic individualism in its pure market form, in the tradition of Locke, Hobbes, and Adam Smith, contrasts sharply in the themes of newer theorizing. Max Weber stressed that deeper aesthetic issues could be distinctly more personal and individualistic than many other political activities (1968: 607–610). Our last book illustrating this transformation and extension of the New Political Culture is *The City as an Entertainment Machine* (Clark 2003), whose title stresses the new importance of entertainment, consumption and culture for cities. It lays

**PART FOUR ACTIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL REPERTOIRES**

**Table 4: *Rising membership of cultural activity groups***

<b>Country</b>	<b>1981</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>Delta</b>
Netherlands	12.5	34.6	45.2	32.7
USA	13.9	19.7	36.9	23.0
Sweden	13.0	12.7	26.7	13.7
Finland	3.1	20.1	14.6	11.5
Canada	9.7	17.7	20.1	10.4
Denmark	6.2	12.5	16.6	10.4
Belgium	10.3	16.2	18.9	8.6
Iceland	7.6	13.8	15.5	7.9
Estonia		11.1	7.9	7.9
South Korea	3.2	11.0		7.8
Japan	3.8	6.0	11.0	7.2
Norway	6.6	13.5		6.9
Italy	3.9	4.9	9.9	6.0
West Germany	6.1	12.0		5.9
South Africa	8.2		13.5	5.3
Britain	6.1	9.3	10.4	4.3
Ireland	6.7	10.1	10.9	4.2
Argentina	5.3	5.9	9.0	3.7
Mexico	6.5	11.5	9.5	3.0
France	5.6	8.8	8.1	2.5
Spain	4.9	5.3	6.6	1.7
Northern Ireland	6.1	10.9	7.6	1.5
Hungary		2.5	3.6	1.1
Romania		1.6	2.6	1.0
Austria	13.0	8.0	13.2	0.2
Chile		9.3	9.3	0
Bulgaria		4.3	4.0	-0.3
Portugal		6.2	3.7	-2.5
Brazil		5.4	2.4	-3.0
Latvia		6.8	3.7	-3.1
Russia		4.9	1.2	-3.7
Lithuania		7.3	2.9	-4.4
China		7.3	2.2	-5.1

out an analytical perspective stressing the importance of amenities as attracting persons to locations that have the most powerful amenities (schools, low crime, clean air, friends and family, restaurants, cultural facilities).

We first ask whether membership in cultural organizations has been rising and, if so, what are its political implications. Table 5 shows the results for the period 1981–2000 using the World Values Survey.

The conclusion: for most countries, including the US, the picture that emerges is that cultural group membership is rising indeed. Note however that this does not seem to be the case in post-communist countries. Since in the literature much attention is given to generational differences in values, behaviour and what else more, in Figure 1 we analyzed how generations differ in the membership of cultural activity groups.




Figure 2: Generations and memberships to cultural activity groups. ( $F = 115.196$ ;  $P < 0.001$ ,  $N = 78,675$ )

**Table 5: Culture as Public Good (Impact of associational membership on political participation by association type)**

Association Sector	Political Action		Generalized Trust/ Community Credit Slips		Political Trust and Efficacy		Optimism Tolerance, Free Riders hip		All	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Political	100.0	40	30.0	20	15.4	13	18.9	37	50.0	110
Economic	72.2	36	40.9	22	39.1	23	19.0	21	47.1	102
Group rights	48.0	25	7.7	13	27.3	11	0.0	19	23.5	68
Community	75.0	32	52.6	19	28.6	14	10.3	29	43.6	94
Cultural	69.6	23	76.5	17	50.0	14	35.0	20	58.1	74
Personal interest	63.0	27	57.9	19	41.2	17	9.5	21	44.0	84
Social	60.0	5	0.0	7	25.0	8	50.0	2	27.3	22
Total	73.4	188	42.7	117	34.0	100	16.1	149	44.4	554

Note: Entries are the percentages of associations of each sector whose members are significantly different from non-members, controlling for age, education, sex, size of community, and (in the US) race. The *N* in each cell is the number of tests for significance, with each test based on association-indicator dyad.  
From Stolle and Hochoy (1998: 58)

The above of course leads to the conclusion that Verba and Nie (1972) and Putnam are mistaken on one thing: Culture is on the rise without any doubt. This validates Inglehart's claim (1977, 2003) that culture will continue to be an important part of civic life. An important note, however, is that while it may be true that culture is on the rise, this does not imply that Inglehart's diagnoses as to its causes and mechanisms are correct. This rise of culture is much more nuanced and context-dependent than his model suggests.

The existing literature on associational membership has shown that members of civic organizations tend to score significantly higher than non-members in most if not all indicators of political participation, from contacting a public official to be politically engaged or to trust in public institutions (e.g. Stolle and Rochon 1998). What has been less studied is the impact of *different* types of associations upon political participation (an exception is Bowler, Donovan, and Hanneman 2003). Our work on cultural participation addresses this gap in the literature. We wish to make two distinct claims.

First, we argue that participation in cultural organizations and events belongs to the broader political repertoire typical of NPC citizenship, which includes many activities of protest and self-expression. To express yourself through music, fashion, and cultural practices is, we believe, an extension of your autonomy as a critical, engaged citizen.

Second, cultural participation has significant impact as a "public good". Our claim is that when focus rests exclusively on "public interest organizations" (e.g. environmental or consumer groups), we lose sight of other types of organizations that provide public goods. Cultural organizations are paramount in this regard. Following this claim of culture as a public good, we expect different types of association to have different political impacts with cultural associations exhibiting higher than average scores. Table 5, drawing on cases from the US, Germany and Sweden, provides some evidence supporting this hypothesis.

As we see above, cultural participation is on the rise and its political implications are far-reaching. Those who spend time in going to music festivals, art galleries, or conceive of the way they dress as part of their "do-it-yourself biography" (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995), are also those who join more often NPC-based forms of political participation. To understand the dynamics of this general rise in salience of culture,

our models need to conciliate cross-national analysis with detailed local studies. In other words, context matters, both at the level of countries and at the level of cities and neighborhoods. In fact, it is at the local level that the societal shift from class politics and clientelism is best captured and its nature properly understood. The FAUI data shows that the rise of NPC is far from being a linear process of diffusion of values. This process sometimes has been messy, it is usually complex, and is always very sensitive to local dynamics. In the next section, we submit the Tocqueville–Putnam model to a systematic cross-national comparison. This will be then followed by a contemporary re-edition of Tocqueville’s classic comparison between France and the US, in which we make use of our concept of “scene” to enlighten the local dynamics of cultural participation.

## **5. BEYOND THE TOWN MEETING CIVIC TRADITION**

An alternative to the Tocqueville–Putnam tradition is a more sensitive cultural palette that might help us repaint some of the traditional (New England-inspired) institutions to make them more tractable to persons who find their intricacies off-putting. Additionally, altogether different institutions may be crafted or ridden to capture the energies of persons whose cultural backgrounds are closer to the matador than the civics teacher. One source of inspiration one can draw upon is concrete, successful cases of new modes of securing political legitimacy other than voting or citizen participation.

Bogotá, Naples, and Chicago are among the many sources of a new style of leadership and citizenship, new modes for engaging citizens that often are in conflict with the Tocqueville–Putnam tradition. Rather than focusing on the Kiwanis Club or the League of Women Voters, mayors in Naples, Chicago, and especially Bogotá have developed highly popular, symbolic leadership, joined in specific actions, as alternative modes of governance that work (instead of the classic civic group). These alternative modes of urban governance work in part since they are founded on a base of distrust, alienation, and cynicism that makes the Tocqueville model distinctly more difficult to construct. In the last few years, we have collaborated with several Latin Americans, Italians, and Spaniards to document and generalize the lessons from Bogota, Naples and even

Chicago in a manner that they might be applicable to situations such as the civic vacuum found in Mexico City as well as some LA (and Chicago) neighborhoods.<sup>2</sup>

Consider the following examples of non-traditional policies that worked. These come from our Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Project, which for over 20 years has identified creative policy innovations and helped bring them to other locations. Naples had hundreds of shrines and small parks that were closed for decades. A new administration engaged local groups to mobilize citizens and classroom students to reclaim the small shrines and parks and keep them open, in an explicit effort to broaden civic engagement, starting from neighborhood amenities. Crime is salient everywhere. Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) created regular meetings of police and local neighbors to review strategies and collaborate on improving safety. Crime has dropped substantially. Chicago has created Tax Increment Financing (TIFF) districts that sponsor neighborhood development initiatives. They obtain funding from property value growth in the neighborhood area. Funds are used to improve the district, thereby channeling funds that are not reviewed in the normal ways by the City government.

These examples seem to suggest that democracy does not require voting and citizen participation, i.e. political legitimacy can be attained through channels other than those suggested by the Tocqueville-Putnam model. Take yet another example, now of Colombia's capital, Bogotá. During the 1980s and 1990s, Bogotá was known mostly for being the murder capital of the world, one of the most violent cities in the world, with a peak rate of approximately 80 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 1993. Bogotá was a clear reflection of Colombia's critical situation of continuing civil war, drug-related crime and rampant political corruption. But in 1995, after an unusual political campaign, the former university professor of mathematics and philosophy, Antanas Mockus, was elected mayor. This highly charismatic mayor introduced a new style of political leadership that contradicted most of the assumptions of Putnam's New England "town meeting" participation model. Yet his "Civic Culture Program" was a resounding success, creatively empowering citizens to solve many of the common problems that affect urban life. In fact, what Mockus did was to turn Putnam's Tocquevillian logic on its head. Instead of conceiving of "good government" as the product of "civicness", Mockus's innovative "Civic Culture Program" demon-



Figure 3: Mayor Mockus as “Super Citizen”

strated that civicism could actually be a product of good government. Bogotá’s administration under Mockus made extensive use of every sort of pedagogical device, communication strategy, and symbolic language to engage citizens in the transformation of the everyday use of urban contexts.

The lesson to draw from Bogotá, Naples and Chicago, is that new problems require new solutions. Old forms of political legitimacy have been undermined: citizens, especially in locations with weak traditions of citizen participatory democracy are nowadays more alienated, indi-


vidualistic and sophisticated than they have been in the past. Mayors in such locations are thus often considering other means than the ones prescribed by the Tocqueville-Putnam tradition to achieve their ends. Some, like Mockus in early 21st century in Bogotá, took recourse to a mixture of *charismatic legitimacy* and self-expressively *individualistic legitimacy* to attain his political goals, and met with considerable success. Though traditionalistic, egalitarian and utilitarian-particularistic forms of legitimacy might still retain some of their appeal, there is a growing demand for more individualistic, charismatic, and creative forms of legitimacy. Innovations — exceptions to the Tocqueville-Putnam model — abound. We need to look further across the world, and incorporate more diverse approaches to enrich our understanding of democratic options and patterns.

Some core ideas from the above discussion can now be joined to controversial and competing findings about social capital and organizations. Tocqueville and Putnam's theory draws on cases like Massachusetts town meetings and Northern Italian City States, where more participation of citizens seems to have increased their trust, and feelings of support and legitimacy about the political system. We term this Model 1. There are thousands of studies that explore this pattern, but we cite just a few distinctive results that help contextualize it. One is Angelika Vetter (2007) who studied citizen participation using ISSP, WVS, and similar data, linking in a theoretically distinctive way the national and the local. She found that citizens who participated more in *local* organizational activities felt substantially more legitimacy for the *national* political system. This held strong in many of the West European countries and the US. So, participation leads to more trust and legitimacy, local and national in these results.


A second set of studies focuses on areas like Latin America (e.g. Sudarsky 2002 and Moreno 2001) and show that civic participation and trust and legitimacy are low in most Latin American countries. This has led many following the Tocqueville-Putnam tradition to search for ways to increase participation, hoping it will engage citizens more broadly, reduce violence, and contribute to public and civic wellbeing. We could call this Model 2. But it is simply the obverse of Model 1 and does not per se question the causal dynamics of Tocqueville and Putnam.

## PART FOUR ACTIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL REPERTOIRES

Models 1 and 2  
N W Europe High on both variables  
Latin Am Low on both



Model 3, maybe 4?  
Asian cases low on civic participation but high on trust.  
Yet they may vary on causes of trust



Model 4  
Negative impact



But if we shift to certain Asian countries, the quasi-determinism of Models 1 and 2 is called into question. Model 3 is thus posited, where a positive relation between non-civic variables may substitute for the civic participation so stressed in Model 1. That is, civic participation in Japan is low. By some measures, it is even in the range of Latin America. However, contradicting Models 1 and 2, in Japan trust and legitimacy are roughly similar to Western Europe and the US — as measured by standardized surveys such as the ISSP and WVS. Seymour M. Lipset, in *American Exceptionalism* (1996), discusses these sorts of results in detail in his last section and appendices with data on Japan; so does Francis Fukuyama in his book *Trust* (1995). However the highly detailed analysis by Kobayashi (2008) of Japan citizens questions the depth of this trust, and suggests it is often constrained by traditional leadership in rural localities, clientelist linkages for some citizens, strong party allegiance of others. He suggests that the widespread clientelist practices of the Liberal Democratic Party are undermining trust for many citizens, especially among younger, more educated, professionals who live in the

larger cities which have generally elected mayors and governors that are not LDP party members. Kobayashi adds substantially more depth and subtlety by combining “rich citizen” and “leader”, national and local data, in overlapping analyses. He stresses within-country differences and change dynamics. Yet overall, he shows that many of the “normal” practices of North America and West Europe do not operate as widely assumed (e.g. Inoguchi 2002). Without seeking to detail how and why, we list some major factors that these and other studies of Japan have stressed: the intensity of the family, the social indebtedness which children feel toward parents and authority figures, the tight social relations of work circles in large industries and class rooms for students, the clientelist linkages to traditional leaders which these overlapping, intense social relations enhance and legitimate. In his book on Japanese culture, S.N. Eisenstadt details how despite continual efforts by foreigners and “modernization” or “reform” over the twentieth century, these patterns adapt and continue (Eisenstadt 1995).

The universality of Tocqueville (Model 1) is more deeply challenged by a provocative recent doctoral dissertation by Seokho Kim (2008) who investigates these patterns by comparing them across 38 countries using the ISSP national survey data for citizen participation, trust, and related items. He finds the expected patterns for much of Northwest Europe and the US: Model 1 holds, though it reveals some surprising exceptions (Table 6). The most dramatic results, however, are that in many countries outside Northwest Europe and the US, civic participation *reduces* trust and support for the political system, shown here at Model 4.

He details this pattern for South Korea. Kim’s core interpretation is that many Korean “civic groups” work following distinct rules: as clientelist, particularistic civic groups (i.e., high school and college alumni associations) which are, by definition, closed to those who did not attend that school or college, and do not have a wide enough membership to generate trust and legitimacy across the full citizenry. In fact, they may do the opposite: where they are more active, they may close off access to political leadership by others, especially lower status citizens. This is closer to the prebendal form of exchange among leaders that Max Weber detailed, and which some clientelist studies suggest persists especially in poorer countries where public policies remain highly clientelist and elitist; benefits do not trickle down to the broad general public of citizens as much as in other countries.<sup>3</sup>

Table 6: A List of ISSP Countries by Capacity of Voluntary Associations to Develop Civic Resources

		Civic Virtue	
		Significant	Insignificant
Trust	Significant	<b>Group I</b> <b>US, Australia, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Latvia, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Uruguay, Venezuela</b>	Group II Czech Republic, Ireland, Poland, Slovak Republic, Sweden
	Insignificant	Group III Bulgaria, Great Britain, Flanders, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Taiwan	<b>Group IV</b> <b>Korea, Austria, Brazil<sup>†</sup>, Cyprus, Hungary, Philippines, Poland, Portugal<sup>††</sup>, Russia, Slovenia</b>

<sup>†</sup> Associational membership significantly and negatively affects social trust

<sup>††</sup> Associational membership significantly and negatively affects civic virtue

The findings are distinctly provocative, as they distinguish Portugal from Spain, yet find that Brazil is closer to the Portuguese, not the Spanish pattern in Table 5. Spain joins the Northern European countries in illustrating the Model 1 pattern above. Portugal is the opposite, illustrating Model 4, with negative impacts of civic participation in both measures (civic virtue and trust), similar to other countries that are consistently negative, like Austria and Poland. Are these Group IV countries more consistently clientelist and prebendal? We cannot tell without further analysis, but the underling full regression tables for Spain, Portugal, Brazil, and the Netherlands are listed in the Appendix for inspection. These are summarized in Table 5. Note that Brazil is only negative on one of the two measures.

Kim suggests clientelism, and we want to know how this might operate, or other processes might generate distrust. For more participation to generate less trust in a clientelist system, presumably it is the non-members who feel resentment and distrust from being excluded from clientelist organizations. It should be possible to look for direct evidence in a general citizen survey asking about membership (and non-membership); would this resentment effect not be stronger among non-members? But this is not the Table 5 finding. If there is a clear negative effect of participation, as in Table 5, then some specific direct effects should be explored.

Which organizations encourage distrust among their members? Terrorist and all organizations proposing “conspiratorial” thinking imply that the “establishment” is not to be trusted. Alternatively, Richard Nixon and Slobodan Milosevic are not the only leaders to encourage distrust. Organizations worldwide that criticize and emphasize criticism thus could encourage distrust. The mass organizations are unions, parties, and churches. In examining Group IV countries, one wonders about unions and radical parties in Austria, Brazil, Hungary, and Russia. Slovenians lived under the domain of Serbs like Milosevic for centuries. Some churches also promote distrust. The Roman Catholic Church fostered distrust of the Communist leadership before 1989 in Poland. In the 2008 US Presidential Primary election, Barack Obama was criticized for attending a church whose minister blamed white American elites for having used bombs and creating resentment, which in turn led to the September 11, 2001 NYC bombing.

The general point is that cultural content matters, and varies by context. Thus the Tocqueville of Model 1 is inevitably wrong for some organizations. Too many studies have only measured organizational membership and participation, while omitting organizational culture. This is an important, classic contribution of cross-national research, and anthropological fieldwork: it shows us our ethnocentrism. These dramatic results are definitely unexpected: *that more civic participation brings less trust and civic virtue/legitimacy* (Model 4 found in countries in Group IV in Table 5). Surely the first steps should be to explore these patterns with other models, other data (like the WVS). We should try various forms of sensitivity analysis, making small changes in models and measures and looking for changes in results. It would also be useful to review past studies using national data for countries like Portugal, Russia, Poland, to see if they contradict Kim’s dramatic results, or more generally, to try to explain where and why one can find elements of Models 1, 2, 3, or 4 in different contexts, across and within countries. Do they vary by urban-rural, by more/less clientelist contexts, do they shift by types of civic associations, for instance. Surely the rapid growth and spread of civic associations globally suggests that they vary hugely in their actual operating principals and consequences. Tocqueville should enjoy the challenge of globalizing his theory.

## 6. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA REVISITED

As we have seen above, civic engagement and participation depend on the cultural and ideological context. According to the World Values Survey (1981, 1990), a sharp decline in political interest rates (presumably formal, state politics) and rising abstention in France coexists with a widespread increase in all NPC citizenship activities (petitions, boycotts, demonstrations). France, in turn, has historically been a global leader in cultural amenities, which provides us with an excellent illustration of the recent rise in salience of culture documented above. Our goal, like Tocqueville's, is to try to identify emerging trends in democratic politics. An important form of specification of "context" we have developed is the notion of "scene", which tries to capture clusters of cultural amenities. This concept helps us to further specify the dynamics of the emerging political trends.

Music, art, and theatre critics have long invoked "scenes," but social scientists have barely addressed the concept (Blum 2003 began). In a recent paper, Silver, Clark and Rothfield (2006) suggest a "theory of scenes" as elements of urban/neighborhood life. Scenes have risen in salience as analysts recognize that jobs and distance explain less, and amenities and lifestyle are critical elements driving economic development and migration. This theory of scenes is more than 1. neighborhood 2. physical structures 3. persons labeled by race, class, gender, education, etc. They include these but stress 4. the specific combinations of these and activities (like attending a concert) which join them. These four components are in turn defined by 5. the values people pursue in a scene. General values are *legitimacy*, defining a right or wrong way to live; *theatricality*, a way of seeing and being seen by others; and *authenticity*, as a meaningful sense of identity. They add sub-dimensions, like egalitarianism, traditionalism, exhibitionism, localism, ethnicity, transgression, corporateness, and more. All the dimensions combine in specific ideal-types of scenes like Disney Heaven, Baudelaire's River Styx, and Bobo's Paradise.

Researchers have long recognized that the organization of life's necessities into meaningful social formations (neighborhoods) and that the organization of labor into larger formations (firms, industrial districts, classes) can produce significant consequences that go beyond the sum of these formations' parts (Putnam, Marx, and many others). Our

proposal is that scenes organize consumption into a meaningful social activity and that these social formations can and must be studied in their own terms as modes of association.

There are three broad dimensions of experience that define a consumer out to ‘experience’ the world (rather than to reside in it or to make new products). We believe that being a consumer means being oriented toward 1) the pleasures of *appearances*, the way we display ourselves to others and see their images in turn. This we call *theatricality*. Determinate scenes give determinate meaning to the theatricality of consumers’ lives. Being a consumer also means 2) being oriented toward the pleasures of having an *identity*, who we are and what it means to be genuine and real rather than fake and phony. This we call *authenticity*. Determinate scenes give determinate meaning to the authenticity of consumers’ lives. And finally, being a consumer means 3) orienting oneself toward the pleasures of holding *moral beliefs and intentions*, the authorities on which we take our judgments to be right or wrong. This we call *legitimacy*. Determinate scenes give determinate meaning to the legitimacy of consumers’ lives.

This third dimension is directly related with our paper’s theme. Let us now see exactly how this is so. To enter into a space of shared consumer activity is to open oneself up to a world of seeing and being seen as if acting a part, as if one were a work of art to be enjoyed and taken in. Scenes give specific meaning to this part of the consuming self through the ways they determine what counts as successful theatrical behavior. The activity of consuming, however, is not exhausted by its theatricality; scenes are more than human showcases. The activity of consuming is an *intentional* activity in which one makes decisions about what to consume, what to enjoy, what to appreciate. Intentions imply reasons; and reasons rest on authoritative standards of judgment.

Legitimacy thus defines for consumers a goal (ethically right belief), an activity (submission/rejection of imperatives and prohibitions), and a set of substances to be worked on (the will, the intention to act). But these goals and activities can give determinate meanings to consumer life in different ways, and determinate scenes will provide different sorts of symbolic legitimation to the activity of consuming: legitimacy may be rooted in ancestral heritage and the wisdom of generations, in the exceptional personality of charismatic individuals, in the notion of equal respect for all, in the efficient and productive pursuit of indi-

#### PART FOUR ACTIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL REPERTOIRES

viduals' material self-interest, in the expression of each person's unique creative imagination. Specific scenes become the scenes they are in part by making this aspect of the consuming self determinately meaningful in these various ways. Because the goals, activities, and standards that legitimate consumption must always be determinately specified, we focus on five specifications, or, again, sub-dimensions, that allow us to recognize specific forms of scenes in terms of the specific ways in which they promote different senses of the legitimacy of the consumption: *traditionalistic* legitimacy, *egalitarian* legitimacy, *charismatic* legitimacy, *utilitarian-individualistic* legitimacy, and *self-expressively individualistic* legitimacy.

These five types of legitimacy are certainly not exhaustive, but they do capture, the most common legitimation practices which groups of amenities help to cultivate. This list is an adaptation from the work of Max Weber, Robert Bellah, and Daniel Elazar. Weber, of course, famously identified three types of legitimate authority: traditional, legal-rational, and charismatic (Weber 1978). These describe different ways in which subjects can experience exercises of power as appropriate and right rather than as arbitrary force. For our purposes, these types of legitimacy describe standards by which members of a scene experience their cultural participation as a valuable and appropriate use of their time and energy rather than wasteful, radical, sinful, or boring.

We have supplemented Weber's categories on two fronts. First, we have replaced his legal-rational category (where legitimate authority is based on the formal structure of laws) with two categories: utilitarianism and expressivity. We do so, following Robert Bellah, because modern American individualism is more complicated than Weber's typology can capture. Many individuals make their judgments based on standards of efficiency and rationality, but many others seek opportunities for creative expression (Bellah 1996). Secondly, following Daniel Elazar, we include egalitarianism in order to capture the power of the strands of New England moralism running through so much of American culture (Elazar 1975). A moral approach to culture fits cultural activity into the larger goal of creating a "city on a hill" where all humans are treated equally regardless of origins or heritage, the pursuit of private interests is viewed as corrupting, and creative expression is a dangerous luxury. There may, of course, be important gaps in this typology, but it does describe the dominant terms in which cultural life matters to 21st-century

Americans: as an expression of their heritage, their creativity, their charismatic heroes, their righteousness, or their industriousness.

## 7. CONCLUSION: BEYOND TOCQUEVILLE

From 1970s, a NPC emerged in developed countries, and with it broader political repertoires. With globalization, this trend intensified and culture rose in salience. Scenes are a new sensitive way to capture the rise of culture, since they stress culture's multifaceted dimensions without falling into a postmodernist view that cultural outlooks are near-unique to each individual. Discussion, especially by social scientists, has been too much dominated by the Tocqueville–Putnam approach. It is not wrong, but incomplete, especially in areas of the world with weak exposure to the Northwest European Protestant traditions of individualistic democracy. This paper proposes a set of concepts and some core propositions about alternative mechanisms which may successfully engage citizens with their political systems — in addition to voting and civic participation, as stressed by the Tocqueville–Putnam tradition. Charisma and individualistic self-expression are two resources, as well as two dimensions of legitimacy, which political leaders around the world have employed with considerable success to attain their political goals. Take the example of the arts and entertainment as new major areas of especially “local” policy making. The individual fruition of amenities, mega-cultural events, etc. is a powerful and significant civic engagement, as an alternative to participation in the local neighbors association.

To value the latter over the former, as suggested by most of literature is to miss what is perhaps the single most important social change currently taking place — the shift from a class-based style of politics to an issue-based, individualistic and consumption-oriented mode of citizenship. There is a new kid in town and he is *not* joining the local Kiwanis Club or Boy Scouts. He seldom votes. But he goes to large concerts, enjoys certain sports events as participant and spectator, hangs out at locations he finds attractive in his leisure time, and has a distinctive set of friends. Sensitive civic and political organizers, those who work in the streets with new social movements and new forms of activism, do not waste time lamenting the past but seek to engage these new scenes. In the years to come, as the media and more fluid arrangements like

## PART FOUR ACTIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL REPERTOIRES

scenes grow more visible and more thoroughly documented, even social scientists may come to accept that race, class and gender are not sufficient drivers to join and to vote, and that joining and voting are not the only mechanisms that build legitimacy, trust, and an workable political system.

### NOTES

1. The Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation (FAUI) Project, which covers surveys of local governments in 35 countries, has been studying throughout the world the evolution of this value shift. This chapter is a product of this collaborative effort. Thanks to Meghan Kallman for editorial assistance.
2. Materials include Terry Nichols Clark paper on Bogotá book on Chicago, and New Political Culture in eight books, Eleonora Pasotti's draft book on Bogotá, Naples, and Chicago; Federico Perez case study of Bogota; Clemente Navarro and associates work on the New Political Culture in Mexico, Spain, and Latin America, esp. introduction to Spanish Edition of NPC book. See [www.faiui.org](http://www.faiui.org) for an overview.
3. Walle (2007) maintains that such prebendal clientelism dominates Sub-Saharan Africa.

### REFERENCES

- Alexander, J.C. (ed.) (1998) *Real Civil Societies: Dilemmas of Institutionalization*. London, Sage.
- (2006) *The Civil Sphere*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Almond, G. and Verba, S. (1965 [1963]) *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Boston, Little, Brown and Company.
- Bellah, R.N., Madson, R., Sullivan, W.L., Swindler, A. and Tipton, S.M. (1985) *Habits of the Heart. Individualism and Commitment in American Life*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Beck, U. and Beck-Gernsheim (1995) *The Normal Chaos of Love*. Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Boudon, R. (2006) *Tocqueville for Today*. Oxford, Bardwell Press.
- Bowler, S., Donovan, T., and Hanneman, R. (2003) "Art for democracy's sake? Group membership and political engagement in Europe". *The Journal of Politics*, 65(4): 1111–1129.
- Blum, A. (2003) *The Imaginative Structure of the City*. Montreal, McGill-Queen's University.
- Clark, T.N. (ed) (1981) *Urban Policy Analysis. Directions for Future Research*. London, Sage.
- (ed) (2003) *The City as an Entertainment Machine*. Amsterdam, JAI Press.

- Clark, T. N. and Hoffmann-Martinot, V. (1998) *The New Political Culture*. Boulder, Westview Press.
- Coleman, James S. (1988) "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital". *American Journal of Sociology*, 94 Supplement: Organizations and Institutions: Sociological and Economic Approaches to the Analysis of Social Structure: 95–120.
- Dalton, R.J. (2008) "Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation". *Political Studies*, 56(1): 76–98.
- Elazar, D.J. (1975) "The American cultural matrix". In: Elazar, D.J. and Zikmund, J. (eds), *The Ecology of American Political Culture*. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell: 13–42.
- Eisenstadt, S.N. (1995) *Japanese Civilization*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Fukuyama, F. (1995) *Trust*. New York, Free Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1977) *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- (1997) *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in Forty-three Societies*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Inoguchi, T. (2002) "Broadening the Basis of Social Capital in Japan". In Putnam, R. (ed.), *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 359–392.
- Keane, J. (ed.) (1988) *Civil Society and the State*. London, Verso.
- Kim, S. (2008) *Voluntary Associations, Social Inequality, and Participatory Democracy from a Comparative Perspective*. Doctoral dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Division of Social Sciences, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago.
- Kimmelman, M. (2008) "The 'mash of myriad sounds'". *The New York Review of Books*, 40 (14): 40–44.
- Kobayashi, Y. (2008). *Is Democracy Working in a Democratic Country? — Japanese Case*. Draft MS, Dept of Political Science, Keio University, Tokyo.
- Lipset, S. (1996) *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword*. New York, Norton.
- Moreno, A. (2001) "Democracy and mass belief systems in Latin America". In Camp, R. (ed), *Citizen views of democracy in Latin America*. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press: 27–50.
- Putnam, R. (ed.) (2002) *Democracies in Flux*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Stolle, D. and Rochon, T. R. (1998) "Are all associations alike? Member diversity, associational type, and the creation of social capital". *American Behavioral Scientist*, 42(1): 47–65.
- Tocqueville, A. (2004 [1850–1858]) *Considérations sur la Révolution*. In: *Oeuvres*, III, Paris, Gallimard.
- Silver, D., Clark, T.N., and Rothfield, L. (2006) "A theory of urban scenes". *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association*, Montreal Convention Center, Montreal, Canada.
- Sudarsky, J. (2002) *El Capital Social en Colombia*. Bogotá, Departamento Nacional de Planeación.
- Verba, S. and Nie, N. H. (1972) *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New York, Harper and Row.

#### PART FOUR ACTIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL REPERTOIRES

- Vetter, A. (2007) *Local Politics: A Resource for Democracy in Western Europe?* Lanham, MD, Lexington Books.
- Walle, N. (2007) “Meet the new boss, same as old boss? The evolution of political clientelism in Africa”. In: Kitschelt, H. and Wilkinson, S. (eds), *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 50–67.
- Weber, M. (1968) *Economy and Society*. New York, Bedminster Press.